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Abstract
We present SEALion: an extensible framework
for privacy-preserving machine learning with ho-
momorphic encryption. It allows one to learn
deep neural networks that can be seamlessly uti-
lized for prediction on encrypted data. The frame-
work consists of two layers: the first is built upon
TensorFlow and SEAL and exposes standard al-
gebra and deep learning primitives; the second
implements a Keras-like syntax for training and
inference with neural networks. Given a required
level of security, a user is abstracted from the de-
tails of the encoding and the encryption scheme,
allowing quick prototyping. We present two ap-
plications that exemplifying the extensibility of
our proposal, which are also of independent in-
terest: i) improving efficiency of neural network
inference by an activity sparsifier and ii) trans-
fer learning by querying a server-side Variational
AutoEncoder that can handle encrypted data.
1. Introduction
Despite the success of machine learning prediction services,
privacy of the client’s data is seldom considered a top prior-
ity in their deployment. However, when machine learning
is applied to problems involving sensitive data, privacy is
a requirement that cannot be eliminated. An example is
with medical applications (Kononenko, 2001). Assume that
a hospital aims to automate diagnoses based on medical
imagery. The hospital may not possess enough (labeled)
data in order to train accurate predictive models. It could
however collaborate with a third-party service providing
such predictions, yet ethical and legal requirements need to
be satisfied due to the sensitivity of patients’ data.
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) is emerging as a framework
for privacy preserving prediction services (Gilad-Bachrach
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et al., 2016; Bourse et al., 2018; Sanyal et al., 2018). Upon
agreement on a protocol, the client — the only private key
holder — encrypts and sends its data to the server. The
server performs prediction in the encrypted domain and
gains no knowledge of either input or any intermediate result.
Finally, the client decrypts the predictions. With respect to
privacy, the whole transaction can take place without the
establishment of trust between the two parties — as in a
non-private prediction service. The client must still trust the
server to generate correct predictions.
However, integrating homomorphic encryption with ma-
chine learning models is non-trivial and requires ad-hoc
solutions. In addition, computation on encrypted data is
orders of magnitude slower than the same operation on the
original data. Given that it also requires careful selection
of the encryption parameters, prototyping models requires
much more time and resources.
In this paper, we introduce SEALion, a new framework for
implementing machine learning algorithms that can operate
on homomorphically encrypted data and generate encrypted
predictions. The design is largely inspired by the earlier
work of CryptoNets (Gilad-Bachrach et al., 2016), and the
SEAL library (Laine & Player, 2016) based on the encryp-
tion scheme of (Fan & Vercauteren, 2012). Our framework
aids in quickly prototyping multivariate polynomial func-
tions on encrypted data in general, and their use in neural
networks in particular, without requiring expert knowledge
in the field of cryptography. A main ingredient of the frame-
work is a heuristic search algorithm for selecting optimal
parameters of the encryption scheme.
We showcase the use of SEALion with two applications of
machine learning research. First, we demonstrate how to
improve the speed of neural networks at inference time –
a current major drawback with homomorophic encryption.
The most expensive operation of CryptoNets is the squared
activation function; we sparsify the network activations by
the method of (Louizos et al., 2017).
Second, we introduce the new scenario of encrypted transfer
learning. A client queries a server-side Variational Auto-
Encoder, VAE (Kingma & Welling, 2013), to obtain repre-
sentations used for transfer learning in downstream tasks.
The client is the private key holder: it sends an encrypted
input to the server and obtains an encrypted representation,
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without sacrifycing the privacy of the input.
2. Background
2.1. Homomorphic Encryption
A homomorphism is a map h : X 7→ Y that preserves
the algebraic structure of X in its image in Y . That
is, for any elements a and b in X , it is always true that
h(a+ b) = h(a)⊕ h(b) and h(a · b) = h(a) h(b), where
⊕ and  represent addition and multiplication in Y . Conse-
quently, for a multivariate polynomial f with suitable coeffi-
cients, we have h(f(x1, . . . , xn)) = f(h(x1), . . . , h(xn)).
In homomorphic encryption, h is the encryption function,
X is the plaintext space, Y the ciphertext space, and f the
function that we aim to evaluate on the encrypted data.
We use homomorphic encryption to conceal privacy-
sensitive data without losing the ability to perform simple
algebraic operations such as addition, subtraction and mul-
tiplication. Our framework is based on SEAL (Laine &
Player, 2016) and uses leveled homomorphic encryption,
which requires knowing the number of encrypted operations
in advance. Related homomorphic schemes relax this limi-
tation, but at the price of much higher computational cost
associated with bootstrapping (Chillotti et al., 2016).
For details on the encryption scheme, we refer the reader
to (Fan & Vercauteren, 2012; Laine & Player, 2016) and we
will treat it as a blackbox with the following interface. Every
message is encoded as an n-degree polynomial m. Given a
message polynomial m, we have two functions Enc(m) and
Dec(c) that satisfy the following equivalences for addition:
a + b = Dec (Enc(a)⊕ Enc(b)) and for multiplication:
a · b = Dec (Enc(a) Enc(b)). This naturally extends
to subtraction and negation as well, but does not extend
to division. Every operation on the message polynomial
m is performed within the ring of integers modulo t (the
plaintext coefficient modulus), and every operation on the
ciphertext polynomial c is performed within the ring of
integers modulo q (ciphertext coefficient modulus).
Every operation, including Enc(m), introduces noise that
is dependent on tq into the ciphertext polynomial c. For
example, after adding two ciphertexts together, the resulting
ciphertext will have the sum of the noise of the original ci-
phertexts. The size of ciphertext polynomials is determined
by n and q. The ciphertext coefficient modulus q is selected
to provide a specific security level λ (e.g. 128 bits). The
SEAL library has a built-in (n, λ) 7→ q that maps a poly-
nomial degree to a ciphertext coefficient modulus that is
suitable for the requested security level. Finally, t affects
the level of noise that each operation introduces but also
restricts the plaintext space.
With these primitives, we can evaluate multivariate polyno-
mial functions on homomorphically encrypted data. The
key to performance and accuracy is determining the most
efficient (n, q, t) for which we can still evaluate the function.
2.2. Privacy-Preserving Inference with Homomorphic
Encryption
Homomorphic primitives are applied in machine learning
applications for privacy preservation. Our focus is on our
particular client-server scenario: the server trains a model on
non-sensitive data; the client (the private key holder) queries
the server to perform inference, e.g. to classify an image,
after encrypting its sensitive data; the result is computed
homomorphically as a ciphertext by the server; only the
client can decrypt it, preserving privacy of both input and
output of the service.
A different scenario is that of Secure Multi-party Compu-
tation (SMC), where the involved parties evaluate a model
jointly. While SMC can compute arbitrary functions, it
needs to involve multiple party for privacy preservation and
its security model is different from ours. In the following,
we mainly cite previous work that is relevant to our setting.
(Gilad-Bachrach et al., 2016) introduce CryptoNets, a
class of convolutional neural networks optimized for high
throughput, that use square activations and input discretized
within an arbitrary interval. The leveled homomorphic en-
cryption scheme of (Bos et al., 2013; Laine & Player, 2016)
is used, which implies that the depth of the neural network is
fixed beforehand, depending on the encryption parameters
and architectural choices. The encryption (n, q, t) are manu-
ally chosen for good performance. Our contribution is built
upon CryptoNets by providing a modular and extensible
software architecture1, and automatic parameters selection.
These features are demonstrated by the straightforward im-
plementation of neural networks architectural sparsity and
of Variational AutoEncoders in this work. Faster Cryptonets
are introduced by (Chou et al., 2018), which uses pruning
and quantization to reduce the computational complexity of
the network.
(Bourse et al., 2018) propose a class of neural networks
optimized for low latency, using sign activation functions
and binarized input. It uses a fully homomorphic encryp-
tion inspired by (Chillotti et al., 2016) and can theoretically
construct networks of arbitrary depth. In fact, the authors ob-
serve that the sign function coincidentally can be performed
as part of a bootstrapping procedure, which may rid of the
noise in the encrypted numbers, allowing deeper networks.
However, their use of boostrapping implies stochasticity
and the sign activations introduce additional training issues,
limiting the practice to fairly simple neural networks.
In contrast, (Sanyal et al., 2018) develop fully homomor-
1The SEALion library will be open-sourced at publication time.
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phic encryption to evaluate a network by performing every
arithmetic operation as a composition of binary gates. Ev-
ery operation consists of many bootstraps and is therefore
inherently immune to noise and has no architectural restric-
tions. However, it is slower than any previous work: one
prediction on MNIST takes 32 hours on a single core.
Outside our security model, a hybrid of homomorphic en-
cryption and multi-party computation is used for training
and inference in (Hardy et al., 2017). (Juvekar et al., 2018)
propose a pragmatic hybrid scheme of homomorphic en-
cryption and garbled circuits, in which the client actively
assists in the privacy-preserving evaluation of a neural net-
work. In the approach by (Makri et al., 2019), the model
owner’s SVM classifier is trained on features extracted with
a pre-trained deep convolutional network; subsequently,
data owners can encrypt and submit their features to the
SVM. In (Juvekar et al., 2018), a model was evaluated using
garbled circuits, which requires active participation of the
client, beyond merely encrypting and decrypting the data.
Recently, two frameworks for privacy-preserving deep learn-
ing with secure multi party computation have been intro-
duced by (Ryffel et al., 2018; Dahl et al., 2018), respectively
building on top of PyTorch an TensorFlow. They share
a similar intent of ours, focussing on usability and exten-
sibity, but implement SMC and do not use homomorphic
encryption.
A low-level compiler framework for homomorphic encryp-
tion is detailed in (Dathathri et al., 2018). By traversing
programs that run on encrypted data during the compila-
tion procedure, it can transform programs into optimized
homomorphic evaluation circuits.
2.3. Discretized neural networks
Due to the fact that all operations on ciphertexts are per-
formed in the ring of integers modulo q, we are restricted
to integer weights, rather than usual floating point. In order
to obtain gradients with respect to discretized weights, one
can use the straight-through estimator (Bengio et al., 2013;
Courbariaux et al., 2016): gradients for backpropagation
are simply approximated by the original ones, where no
discretization is in place. In contrast (Bourse et al., 2018)
round weights after training, introducing errors; it is unclear
how this is achieved by (Gilad-Bachrach et al., 2016).
3. Design
An overview of the architecture of our framework is shown
in fig. 1. SEALion itself only implements primitive objects
and operations (sec. 3.1), is not focused on machine learning
and therefore has no notion of training or inference. Instead,
it can only be used to evaluate multivariate polynomial func-
tions on batches of encrypted data (sec. 3.1.1), optionally
HEras
TensorFlow SEALion
CUDA SEAL 3.0
Training Inferences
Figure 1. Architecture of our framework.
using CRT to expand the input and output domain of those
functions (sec. 3.1.2). On top of SEALion, we have built
another layer called HEras, that provides an abstraction over
training neural networks on plaintext data using TensorFlow,
and running inference on encrypted data using SEALion.
SEALion’s internal engine is inspired by TensorFlow. Poly-
nomial functions are expressed using a computational graph.
Each node in this graph represents either a placeholder for
some input data, or the result of some operation, and has
an associated estimated domain. With those domains, this
graph aids in automatically selecting the most efficient en-
cryption that can fit the entire in- and output domain of the
polynomial function.
3.1. SEALion: Primitives
SEALion exposes many primitives that can be applied to
plaintext and ciphertexts. It supports addition, subtraction,
negation and multiplication. Each of those operations take
either a single ciphertext and a plaintext, or two ciphertexts.
In addition, our framework also support element-wise addi-
tion and multiplication of tensors, and matrix multiplication
and inner products.
3.1.1. BATCHING
Like (Gilad-Bachrach et al., 2016), SEALion also supports
batching to minimize the amortized runtime. By default,
encoded in a single plaintext polynomial is a single integer
that can be approximately n log2 t bits. Instead, we can also
use SIMD (Smart & Vercauteren, 2014) to encode n smaller
numbers of log2 t bits, − t2 ≤ a ≤ t2 in a single polynomial.
For this to work, t needs to be prime and t ≡ 1 (mod 2n).
SEALion automatically takes care of selecting encryption
parameters that support batching and the packing of cipher-
texts. In particular, batches provided to SEALion are auto-
matically zero-padded into the batch size supported by the
encryption parameters.
SEALion
x
x1
xi
Forward Pass mod t1
Forward Pass mod ti
. . . . . . . . .
y1
yi
y
Figure 2. Overview of using CRT to decompose large integers dur-
ing the forward pass into smaller components that can be evaluated
in parallel.
3.1.2. CHINESE REMAINDER THEOREM
Recall that larger plaintext coefficient moduli adversely af-
fect the remaining noise budget after each operation. In
order to evaluate functions of increasing depth, we instead
resort to the Chinese Remainder Theorem to decompose
our large plaintext coefficient modulus into smaller moduli.
Specifically, we evaluate the function once for each smaller
modulus, and conclude by assembling the outputs into a
single number using the CRT (fig. 2). This approach was
also taken by (Gilad-Bachrach et al., 2016).
3.2. HEras: Neural Networks
A second layer, HEras (Homomorphic Encryption Keras),
is built on top of these primitives: a neural network frame-
work with an interface similar to Keras, but that can operate
on homomorphically encrypted data. During training, the
parameters of a model are learned with TensorFlow. Once
trained, the model parameters are copied to the inference
engine that runs on top of SEAL.
On a lower level, every forward pass through the network
is implemented in two-fold: one implementation is used
during training and built on top of TensorFlow and is used
for learning the weights of the network, the other implemen-
tation is used during inference for generating predictions on
encrypted data calling SEALion primitives. Every operation
in the forward pass (except for the final activation function,
and the loss function) must be a polynomial function with
integer coefficients. The backward pass is used in backprop-
agation for learning the weights – training never required
handling encrypted data.
All built-in layers take care of discretization, by using
straight-through estimators to obtain gradients for the dis-
cretization function w′ = bw · se where w are the original
floating point weights, and s is a user-provided saturation
hyper-parameter. Higher s will lead to increasingly satu-
rated weights but will likely also increase the magnitude of
the model outputs and thus require more plaintext coeffi-
cients (sec. 3.1.2).
Under the hood, the forward pass of a neural network in
HEras yields a single multivariate polynomial, that is eval-
uated like any other polynomial in SEALion. In fig. 3, we
show an example of a training procedure built with HEras.
In particular, observe the required saturation levels that re-
strict the input domain and aid in estimating the output
domain of the underlying prediction function. In fig. 4, we
show an example of inference with encrypted data.
HEras runs Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014) by default due to a
its per-layer adaptive learning rate, which aids in overcom-
ing the training issues linked to the square activations for
deep networks.
3.3. Automatic Encryption Parameters Selection
The plaintext modulus t is estimated by traversing the graph
and computing the output domain based on the domains
of each intermediate operation. When using HEras, the
estimate can also be computed by evaluating the compu-
tational graph on a small batch of plaintext training data,
and recording the output domain. Since the test set might
follow a different distribution, we add a variable margin to
the recorded domain. The plaintext modulus is subsequently
estimated to be t = 2 ·max (|l|, |u|) · λ where l and u are
the lower- and upperbound of the domain respectively and
λ ≥ 1 is some margin.
Then, we use the CRT to split the modulus in smaller moduli
that are easier to compute. For this to work, the smaller mod-
uli need to be coprime numbers. In addition, for batching to
work, each moduli must satisfy (ti mod 2n) = 1, where ti
is one of the moduli and n is the polynomial degree.
Next, we compare pairs (n, t) of polynomial degrees and
plaintext moduli. The ciphertext coefficient modulus is
provided by SEAL and does not depend on the selected
plaintext coefficient modulus or vice versa. Empirically,
we have found that the runtime of each operation depends
linearly on the polynomial degree n. However, we can pack
more data in polynomials of a larger degree and thus achieve
lower amortized runtime. In addition, runtime depends
linearly on the number of plaintext moduli t (see sec. 3.1.2).
In sum, our heuristic can either optimize for latency by
selecting a candidate with the lowest polynomial degree n,
or for amortized throughput by selecting a candidate with a
higher polynomial degree but fewer plaintext moduli t. The
list of candidates is sorted by this objective.
Finally, the multivariate polynomial function is evaluated
on a small training set for each parameters candidate and we
select the first candidate that can successfully evaluate the
function without running out of noise budget. This occurs
when one of the plaintext moduli ti is too large, since the
noise growth is strongly dependent on ti. In that case, we
decompose t in more but smaller ti and try again.
The security level is a parameter that must be provided by
SEALion
model = Sequential()
model.add(Flatten(input_shape = (28, 28, 1), input_saturation = 4))
model.add(Dense(units = 100, saturation = 2 ** 4))
model.add(Activation())
model.add(Dense(units = 10, saturation = 2 ** 4))
model.compile(loss = ’categorical_crossentropy’, optimizer = ’adam’,
metrics = [ ’categorical_accuracy’ ])
# Train the neural network on plaintext data.
model.fit(x_train, y_train, epochs = 10, batch_size = 64)
Figure 3. An image classifier built with HEras.
# 1. Encrypt the test set. Parameters have been selected during training.
pk, sk = sl.Keypair(model.encryption_params)
e_x_test = pk.encrypt(x_test)
# 2. Run the model on the encrypted input.
e_p_test, metrics = model.predict(e_x_test, encrypted = True)
# 3. Decrypt the predictions and use argmax to get predicted classes.
p_test = sk.decrypt(e_p_test)
p_test = np.argmax(p_test, axis = -1)
Figure 4. Encrypted inference with the image classifier shown in fig. 3.
the user; the automatic selection of encryption parameters
guarantees that the security level is achieved.
3.4. Implementation
SEAL’s APIs are exposed to Python via a C++ bridge. On
top of that bridge, the primitives layer takes care of ab-
stracting away the notion of dealing with multiple smaller
plaintext moduli and handling tensors in addition to scalars.
The neural network framework is written entirely in Python
and resembles the Keras API. However, it does not support
non-polynomial functions (such as ReLU or sigmoid) that
are unavailable when using homomorphic encryption.
4. Application: Sparsification of Neural
Network Architectures
In our first case study, we show that our framework can be
extended to handle model sparsification, with the technique
of (Louizos et al., 2017). An L0 regularizer is applied to
sparsify the squared activations, the main performance bot-
tleneck of SEALion’s deep neural networks. Sparsifying the
weights instead of the activations would not achieve maxi-
mal speedup, because computing the square of ciphertexts
is much more expensive than multiplying plaintexts with
ciphertexts.
4.1. Background
The number of non-zero parameters in a neural network
can be seen as an L0 norm. Using this norm directly
to enforce sparsity is non trivial, due to its intrinsic non-
differentiability. (Louizos et al., 2017) present a solution
based on a smooth approximation. Each network parame-
ter θ is multiplied with a binary gate, i.e. θ · z. In order
to obtain a differentiable parametrization of the network,
we can sample from a binary concrete distribution (Mad-
dison et al., 2016) with parameters (logα, β), stretch on
the interval (ζ, γ) and finally pass through a hard-sigmoid:
hard(·) = max(0,min(1, sigmoid(·) (ζ − γ)+γ)). In sum,
during training each gate z is sampled according to eq. 1
where u ∼ U(0, 1):
z = hard
(
log
(
u
1− u + α
)
/β
)
(1)
The parameters (logα, β) are learned with the
reparametrization trick (Kingma & Welling, 2013).
An approximation of the L0 norm is then obtained as∑|θ|
j=1 sigmoid(logαj − β log −γζ ) and used as regular-
izer. At inference, deterministic gates are computed as:
hard (logα) and rounded. The same technique can be
applied for sparsifying activations by sharing a gate with
multiple parameters.
SEALion
Model Parameters Activations n, |t| Lat.[s] TP[1/h] Acc. [%]
Earlier Work
CryptoNets 126,375 945 4096, 2 250 58,982 98.95
Faster CryptoNets — 945 8192, 2 39.1 754,250 98.71
DiNN-30 26,520 30 — 0.491 6,990 93.46
DiNN-100 79,400 100 — 1.64 2,143 96.35
TAPAS — — — 32[h] — 98.60
Our Work
DNN-30 26,520 30 4096, 1 1.14 12,933,344 97.40
DNN-100 79,400 100 4096, 1 3.28 4,494,965 98.01
CNN-16 79,800 3236 8192, 2 192 153,600 98.96
CNN-16-L0 79,800 762 8192, 2 60 491,520 98.91
Table 1. Our baselines (DNN-30, DNN-100) and our convolutional networks with and without L0 activity sparsifier in comparison to
earlier work by (Gilad-Bachrach et al., 2016; Chou et al., 2018; Bourse et al., 2018; Sanyal et al., 2018). The number of plaintext moduli
is denoted with |t| (see sec. 3.1.2) and is only reported for models built on (Laine & Player, 2016). Other metrics in order: latency,
throughput and accuracy. Runtime is not strictly comparable with previous work due to differences in the hardware and, in same cases,
in the security parameters (see text). For comparison, a standard neural network with ReLU activations and no discretization, with an
architecture as our CNN-16 achieves 98.84% and can generate 120M predictions per hours on plaintext input.
4.2. Implementation
During training, after computing the output of a convolu-
tional layer, the feature maps are multiplied with bze, where
we use the same straight-through estimator to obtain a gradi-
ent for the discretization function as we did for other param-
eters (see sec. 3.2). We add
∑
sigmoid
(
α− β log −γζ
)
as
a regularization to the loss function.
For inference, we compute zˆ = hard (logα) and pass bzˆe to
SEALion when performing the convolution on the encrypted
ciphertexts. In turn, SEALion will skip computing values in
the resulting feature maps for which bzˆe = 0, and therefore
skip the computation of several activations. Users of HEras
can pass the built-in L0 activity regularizer as an argument
to the convolutional layer constructor.
4.3. Experiments
Our model consists of a 1) convolutional layer with 16 filters
of size 5× 5 and 2× 2 strides, 2) a square activation layer,
3) a pooling layer with kernel size 3 × 3 and again 2 × 2
strides, 4) a fully connected layer with 100 units and finally
5) the output layer with 10 units. The L0 activity regularizer
is applied to the filter maps of the convolutional layer.
This architecture is different from (Gilad-Bachrach et al.,
2016; Chou et al., 2018): we use more convolutional filters
but omit their second convolutional and pooling layers. In
total, the number of non-linear layers is the same.
We evaluate the performance of our models on MNIST (Le-
Cun et al., 1998), because it was also used in earlier work
that we can compare with (Gilad-Bachrach et al., 2016;
Chou et al., 2018; Bourse et al., 2018; Sanyal et al., 2018).
In table 1, we compare with the prior state of art. We have
implemented two non-convolutional baseline models with
the same architecture as DiNN-30, 100 from (Bourse et al.,
2018). Our MLP-30, 100 models have approximately 2000
times higher throughput and higher accuracy than DiNN-
30, 100 respectively, but twice the latency.
Our CNN-16 is considerably slower than our non-
convolutional models, due the higher number of activa-
tions, but it obtains the same accuracy as CryptoNets (Gilad-
Bachrach et al., 2016). It improves almost 25% on latency
and achieves almost 3 times higher throughput. This is due
to the architectural differences.
Our CNN-16-L0 model is based on CNN-16 but sparsifies
the model from 3236 activations down to just 762, while
preserving the same level of accuracy. The sparsified model
is more than twice as fast as the original model, and has
almost 10 times higher throughput than CryptoNets.
In fig. 5 we show the evolution of the gates that mask
the feature maps of CNN-16-L0 over time during training.
The regularizer discards information deemed irrelevant for
prediction, such as the MNIST black borders.
All of our models satisfy 192 bits of security and we
borrow coeff modulus 192(n) from SEAL to select
Epoch 1 4 16 64 128
Figure 5. Evolution of gates on two feature maps extracted from
CNN-16 + L0 trained on MNIST.
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Figure 6. Graphical models of a classifier, the Variational AutoEncoder and its application in our transfer learning protocol.
the ciphertext coefficient moduli q, where n is the poly-
nomial degree. For our DNN-30 and DNN-100 models,
(n, log2 q) = (4096, 75) and for our CNN-16 and CNN-16-
L0 models, (n, log2 q) = (8192, 152). We have verified the
security level of these parameters per the recommendations
established by Homomorphic Encryption Standardization
Workshop (Chase et al., 2017). We are comparing with Cryp-
toNets, (n, log2 q) = (4096, 191), for which we do not have
an accurate security estimate, but in general lower q for the
same polynomial degree n raises the security level (Dowlin
et al., 2017).
5. Application: Encrypted Transfer Learning
with Discretized VAE
In our second application of SEALion, we describe the novel
setting of encrypted transfer learning. Specifically, own-
ers of small datasets can exploit existing knowledge from
cloud services that expose embedding obtained by unsuper-
vised learning on similar (but unlabeled) datasets (Bengio,
2012; Noroozi & Favaro, 2016; Pathak et al., 2016). The
expected outcome is a richer representation of the client data
that can be transferred to allow the client to learn models
downstream, or to perform other data analysis tasks, without
sacrificing privacy. As for classification, only the client has
access to plaintext input and output of the service.
We apply Variational AutoEncoders (Kingma & Welling,
2013; Rezende et al., 2014) for unsupervised learning by
the server.
x
Conv Pool µ
σ2
SVM
z
Conv Conv
xˆ
Figure 7. Overview of our VAE implementation. Dashed lines rep-
resent layers with floating point parameters. Opaque lines represent
layers that are evaluated on encrypted data and use straight-through
estimators to obtain gradients for discretized parameters.
5.1. Background
VAE is a latent variable model of the distribution of x,
i.e. p(x) = p(z)pθ(x|z). VAE learns the parameters θ
of the generative model, assuming p(z) as a Normal prior.
However, since z is unobserved the true posterior p(z|x) is
intractable.
VAE takes a variational approximation of the true posterior
as a parametric Gaussian qφ(z|x) = N
(
z;µ,σ2I
)
and
maximize the ELBO, or Evidence Lower BOund of the
marginal log-likelihood:
Ex log pθ(x) ≥ ELBO =
Ex
[
Ez∼qφ(z|x) log pθ(x|z)−KL(qφ(z|x)|| p(z))
]
.
During training, VAE jointly optimizes θ and φ by learning
the generative model pθ(x|z), the decoder, and the varia-
tional approximation of the posterior qφ(z|x), the encoder,
that outputs mean µ and variance σ2 vectors (Figure 6b).
Crucially, VAE introduces the reparametrization trick to
allow efficient gradient estimation for φ. Sampling from
qφ(z|x), i.e. embedding data with the encoder, yields a new
representation useful for tasks such as semi-supervised and
transfer learning (Kingma et al., 2014).
5.2. Implementation
VAE consists of encoder and decoder models. During train-
ing, the encoder samples z ∼ N (µ,σ2) and the decoder
attempts to reconstruct x from the latent representation z,
subject to the KL-term as regularizer. During inference, we
do not need the decoder at all, and only use the latent rep-
resentation for transfer learning — in particular, we do not
sample from the approximated posterior, but only compute
the Normal mean z = µ(x).
In fig. 7, we show an overview of the VAE architecture.
Only the convolutional layer of the encoder model and the
fully connected layer towards µ are discretized. As such,
only the path from x to µ is evaluated during inference (the
variance function is not used). The decoder does not require
adaptations to HE and thus we can learn its weights θ in
full precision, and use standard ReLU activations and batch
SEALion
overlap no overlap
Originals VAE dVAE VAE dVAE
Figure 8. Left: Reconstructions of MNIST digits by VAE and
dVAE. Two posterior samples per image are given. Right: same
but with models trained on classes 3-9 only and reconstructions
from classes 0-2, simulating transfer learning.
normalization. We call our model dVAE, for “discretized”,
where discretization is applied to the encoder weights φ.
In our protocol, the server first trains a VAE on a large
unlabeled dataset (fig. 6b). Instead of training a classi-
fier directly on the small local dataset (fig. 6a), the client
now sends encrypted data Enc(x). The server responds
by performing encrypted inference Enc(z) = µ(Enc(x)).
Finally, the client decrypts Enc(z) with the private key to
obtain the embeddings. Instead of training a local model
of the original raw input x, the client can now exploit the
richer representation z and train a local classifier (fig. 6c).
This is in contrast to the more usual framework (assumed in
the rest of the paper) where the server exposes a classifier.
5.3. Experiments
We test dVAE on MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998) and EM-
NIST (Cohen et al., 2017). We test two variants of transfer
learning. In both, the client trains a local Gaussian ker-
nel SVM classifier on a small set of labelled data. In the
overlapping setting, the SVM is trained on the same class
distribution as the dVAE; e.g. for MNIST, they are both
trained on classes 0-9. In the non-overlapping setting, the
dVAE is trained on a subset of the classes and used for trans-
fer on the remaining; e.g. for MNIST, it is trained on classes
3-9 and the classifier is learned on the representation of 0-2.
As an initial qualitative assessment, fig. 8 shows the recon-
structions of dVAE and VAE. The quality of the reconstruc-
tions of dVAE does not look too dissimilar than of regular
VAE and therefore we assume that the underlying latent
space is also not significantly degraded.
Next, we compare accuracy of the Gaussian kernel SVM
trained on the original images versus the representation re-
trieved from dVAE. Experiments are repeated 25 times and
averages are shown in fig. 9. We can see that the classifier
indeed benefits from the representation of the dVAE in com-
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Figure 9. Test accuracy obtained on MNIST and EMNIST. Average
accuracy and standard deviation are reported; to help readability,
we did not include the standard deviation of the SVMs.
parison to the original images. However, when the class
distributions do not overlap, the classifier trained on the
embeddings performs only marginally better on MNIST. As
EMNIST has 37 more classes than MNIST, transfer learning
appears to be more successful as the representation may be
less specific and useful for the hold out classes. These pre-
liminary results support the viability of our private protocol
for transfer learning, although experiments on more realistic
datasets and task shall be conducted in future work.
6. Conclusions
We have introduced SEALion, a new exensible framework
for building deep neural networks that can perform inference
on homomorphically encrypted data, protecting the privacy
of data owners utilizing prediction services. On top of the
innovation of CryptoNets (Gilad-Bachrach et al., 2016), our
contribution provides an modular and extensible software ar-
chitecture for quick prototyping machine learning research
ideas. The automatic encryption parameters search algo-
rithm side-steps many of the tedious implementation details
that required ad-hoc solutions in previous work.
Built on SEALion, we also introduced two practically-
relevant novelties in the area. We showed how to improve
both latency and throughput of encrypted inference by spar-
sifying the neural networks’ activations. Furthermore, we
have defined the new scenario of encrypted transfer learning,
where a server exposes a feature extractor that preserves the
privacy of the client data.
SEALion
We believe that our contributions will benefit research efforts
at the intersection of machine learning and homomorphic
encryption, by providing both the tools and inspiration that
are necessary to incorporate privacy-preserving aspects into
the inference phase of machine learning models.
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